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Kensuke Kojima
Which classical correspondence is valid in intuitionistic modal logic?
Log. J. IGPL 20(2012), no. 1, 331-348
03B45 03B70
Formulas of the language of modal logic correspond to conditions on the acces-
sibility relations of the Kripke models used to interpret that language. Thus,
for instance, the formula T (p → p) corresponds to the requirement that
the accessibility relation should be reflexive, and transitivity is postulated by
4 (p → p). Such relationships between modal formulas and properties
of the accessibility relation are studied in what has become to be known as
“correspondence theory”; cf., for instance, Johan van Benthem’s survey article
on that subject, MR1884636. Kojima’s article deals with the correspondence
theory of modal logics which are based on intuitionistic rather than classical
propositional logic. The article consists of three parts: the first part presents
a sufficient condition under which formulas of intuitionistic modal logic corre-
spond to the same relational properties as their classical counterparts, the sec-
ond part gives some applications of the article’s results to Abadi’s access control
logic (cf. MR2507652 and MR2477196), and the last part provides discussions of
supplementary topics, generalizations, comparisons with related research, and
a summary.
The discussion of intuitionistic correspondence theory is based on the bi-
modal IM-frames introduced by Wolter and Zakharyaschev; cf., e.g., MR1720795.
These frames extend the ordinary Kripke-frames for intuitionistic logic by an
accessibility relation for the interpretation of the modal operators. Thus an IM-
frame is a triple 〈W,≤, R〉 where W is a non-empty set of worlds (information
states), ≤ a partial order, and R a binary relation on W . As usual, the partial
order ≤ is used to interpret the intuitionistic conditional; R, on the other hand,
functions as the modal accessibilty relation. It is postulated that the two rela-
tions R and ≤ satisfy the condition (≤;R;≤) = R (where the semicolon denotes
the composition of binary relations). The semantic clauses for the connectives
⊥, >, ∧,∨,→ are the normal ones for intuitionistic logic; and the necessity
operator , too, receives its well-known interpretation. The semantic clause for
the possibility operator ♦, however, is more complicated than usual: ♦A is (in-
tuitionistically) true at w iff for each w′ with w ≤ w′ there is some v such that
both w′Rv and A is true at v. There are several reasons for this complication
(cf. p. 334 of the article), one of them is that one wants to keep the heredity
condition known from ordinary intuitionistic logic.
A formula A is said to be robust iff for each frame F the formula A is intu-
itionistically valid in F iff it is classically valid in that frame. (Classical validity
is defined in the usual way by simply ignoring the intuitionistic accessibility
relation ≤ and by giving up the intuitionistic restriction on valuations) In that
case the formula fixes, as is shown in the article, the same relational property
in both frameworks, the classical and the intuitionistic one. A sufficient condi-
tion for robustness is given for formulas of type A → B and type A → ♦B. A
formula is said to be “positive” if it does not contain the conditional →; it is
said to be “♦-protected” if all occurences of ♦ are immediately preceded by the
-operator; and if each of a formula’s propositional variable is preceded by that
operator, the formula is said to be “atom-protected”. A formula is protected
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(simpliciter) iff it is both ♦- and atom-protected. The following result is proved:
If A is a protected positive formula and B a ♦-protected one, then both A→ B
and A→ ♦B are robust.
Using this result, some (in)dependence results in access control logic are
achieved in the article’s second part. In its final part a simple example of a
formula, namely p→ p ∨ ♦p, is given which is not protected but nevertheless
stable which proves that the criterion given before, though sufficient, is not
necessary. The formula just cited corresponds to seriality (i.e., the property that
for each w there is a v such that wRv) in both the classical and the intuitionistic
framework. Another example of a non-protected though robust formula is Lo¨b’s
axiom ((p→ p)→ p), which has a structure more complicated than that of
the first example, which is a conditional of two positive formulas. Grzegorczyk’s
axiom (((p→ p)→ p)→ p), which is neither protected nor robust, is also
discussed and it is explained to which properties it corresponds, respectively, in
the classical and in the intuitionistic framework.
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